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DIGITAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: A way forward for Africa at a 
continental and multilateral level 
Abstract 
 
This paper argues that digital trade can benefit developing countries and result in substantial 
financial gains. The regulation thereof has been at the forefront of negotiations at the 
multilateral level and within regions of Africa. While developing economies do not typically 
reap the benefits of digital progression, this paper proposes that digital trade can be developed 
in such a way so as to prioritise the developmental considerations of Africa specifically. 
Through observing the progress of the WTO platform for digital trade, namely the 
Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, it is seen that the multilateral regulation of digital 
trade is a complex task. Developing country participation at this level is essential to the 
sustainable development of digital trade. Within Africa, there have been notable 
advancements in the regulation of digital trade, evidenced by the establishment of COMESA’s 
Digital FTA. 
The considerations for the advancement of digital trade for a developing continent are 
numerous as not only do the traditional barriers to trade still remain a primary concern but 
there is also the potential threat of furthering the existing digital divide that persists between 
the developing and the developed world. Therefore, the paper proposes that should Africa 
consider developing digital trade through AfCFTA (the African Continental Free Trade 
Agreement) digital trade in services should be prioritised ahead of digital trade in goods. This 
would help overcome Africa’s trade facilitation and development challenges and advance 
Africa’s position in the multilateral trading system. 
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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Digital trade and development 
Digital trade, as an advancement from the traditional forms of trade propelled by 
continuous technological advancements, has many benefits which result in substantial 
financial gains.1 These extend to, but are not limited to, the reduction of costs in 
transacting, shortened procedures, increased market penetration, unlimited 
connectivity and continuous innovation.2 These benefits have been used by 
companies, organizations and even countries to their economic advantage and have 
created the need to reconsider and continuously develop the regulation of digital 
trade.3  
Despite the above-mentioned advantages of trading digital, as with most areas 
in trade, developing countries do not reap the equivalent benefits of digital trade 
participation when compared to those of the more developed nations.4 They face 
numerous issues that are related to their level of economic and industrial development. 
It will be seen, that even where developing economies do have the fundamental 
requirements in place which facilitates their participation, they are often still unable 
to reap the rewards of digital trade.5 This is significant for Africa, as a continent 
comprised of developing and least developing nations.6 The region of Southern Africa 
alone, has the highest number of least developed countries in the world.7 
Notwithstanding these challenges, there is great potential to advance digital trade. 
 The regulation of digital trade is in its infancy in Africa. The developmental 
considerations can be made a priority at an early stage in any regulatory advancements. 
This may, in time, afford the developmental issues greater weight and consideration 
in the negotiations in the multilateral trading system. From a more practical side, it 
shall be seen that digital trade and digitization in general has the capability of 
                                                        
1 Jorge Arbache ‘Seizing the benefits of the digital economy for development’ ICTSD Digital 
Economy 8 June 2018, available at https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/seizing-the-benefits-of-the-digital-
economy-for-development, accessed on 21 December 2018.  
2 Ibid.  
3 This is seen by the recent digital developments of the WTO and of regional groupings such as 
COMESA.  
4 Op cit note 1.  
5 See section 5.4 below.  
6 See country statistics of The World Bank available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr, 
accessed on 14 January 2019.  
7 Roy Katayama & Divyanshi Wadhwa ‘Half of the world’s poor live in just 5 countries’ The World 
Bank, The Data Blog 9 January 2019, available at http://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/half-world-s-
poor-live-just-5-countries, accessed on 14 January 2019.  
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progressing at a rate whereby certain industrial structures, which would previously be 
lacking in developing nations, are no longer needed.8   
The lack of access to markets, as a result of geographical location or inadequate 
resources, is a significant barrier to developing countries’ participation in trade. By its 
very nature, digital trade removes the distance between the parties to the transaction, 
except where physical delivery is still required. In many instances, internet 
connectivity replaces the need for physical infrastructures required in traditional trade. 
The effect of digital trade in facilitating market access has been aptly displayed by the 
integration of MSME’s into the digital economy. 
Studies show that MSMEs that use on-line platforms are around five times more likely 
to export than those in the traditional economy. Empirical research also finds that 
companies connected to the global economy are more productive and contribute to 
the development of more prosperous communities. Small businesses and 
entrepreneurs in developing economies are already at the forefront of this emerging 
trend.9 
The integration of MSME’s into the digital economy is just one practical 
example of digital trade’s potential to advance developmental objectives. However, it 
will be seen that Africa’s experience in digital trade, or lack thereof, is particularly 
complex as there are several other considerations, such as regional integration, that 
are relevant to the discussion. The fundamental consideration of development in 
digital trade shall be the objective of the subsequent research.  
 
1.2. Research objective  
The broad, overarching question that this paper aims to respond to is: how can Africa 
develop a framework for digital trade in order to respond to the international 
technological advancements in trade while addressing the developmental challenges 
it faces as a continent?  The international advancements refer to the development of 
digital trade at the multilateral level while the developmental challenges refer to the 
internal digital progression at a continental level. As the research objective is broad 
and all-encompassing, there are sub questions and considerations to guide the analysis.  
                                                        
8 See section 3.2 below.  
9 ICC ‘WTO Business Focus Group 1: MSMEs and E-commerce’ (2016) Trade Dialogues: Final 
Report at 2.  
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The correlation between digital trade and development was established above 
yet the question remains as to whether Africa can develop and utilise digital trade in 
such a beneficial, trade facilitating way. While in theory it is highly plausible, in 
practice it is not so clear as there are justifiable concerns regarding the possible adverse 
effects of the development of digital trade and there are many considerations to take 
into account. Therefore, one needs to proceed in such a way that advances the 
continent’s digital capabilities while constantly prioritising its developmental agenda.  
It would be useful to consider if the above advancement would be able to serve 
not only the continent’s internal needs but also constitute a platform that is able to 
adequately represent the needs of Africa in the multilateral trading system and global 
digital economy. As such a platform would automatically involve considerations 
found in the process of regional integration,10 it is necessary to consider the potential 
relationship between digital trade and regional integration in Africa.  
 
1.3. Structure 
Chapter one aims to introduce the topic and emphasise the need to consider digital 
trade in the light of development considerations. It highlights the main research 
objective which motivates the following sections.  Chapter two aims to define certain 
terms and concepts, such as digital trade, e-commerce and free trade areas for goods 
and services, that are essential to the understanding of digital trade. The definitions 
and descriptions not only provide clarity but also inform the scope of future 
development and regulation of digital trade.  
Chapter three assesses the impact of Industry 4.0 on the market and how it has 
prompted the growth from traditional forms of trade to digital trade. Prominent 
companies that have leveraged technological developments to their benefit are briefly 
observed, within Africa and in the broader international sphere. As this paper aims to 
consider the future of digital trade in Africa specifically, the recent regulatory 
development of COMESA’s Digital Free Trade Area is examined before observing 
the correlation, if any, between the development of digital trade and trade facilitation.  
Chapter four examines the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) provisions 
on electronic commerce, which is their preferred term as opposed to ‘digital trade.’ As 
                                                        
10 See chapter 6 below.  
 7 
the WTO is the only organisation that establishes multilateral trading rules which 
inform the global system, examining its work is essential to evaluating Africa’s 
position in future digital trade developments. The most significant work of the WTO 
is the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce which was established in 1998 and 
remains in force today, ten years later.11 The Work Programme’s progress will be 
examined through the reports of the designated WTO bodies before observing the 
equivalent of the various Ministerial Conferences, culminating with the most recent 
one in Buenos Aires in 2017.12 
Chapter five will evaluate the developing country concerns in light of the 
development of digital trade. As the developing countries’ concerns reflect upon their 
current position in the multilateral trading system, their growth shall be briefly 
observed from the time of the Doha Round to the most recent Ministerial 
Conference.13 While the developmental issues shall be discussed throughout the paper, 
this section  aims to assess them in greater detail with respect to the traditional barriers 
to trade that are still relevant in the digital sphere and the potential of furthering the 
digital divide between the developing and the developed. The Africa Group’s 
submission to the WTO14 is examined as it is a continent-wide representation of 
developmental concerns for the advancement of digital trade at the multilateral level.  
Chapter six places digital trade in the context of regional integration in Africa 
and aims to explain how the development of the former can facilitate the progression 
of the latter. The regional integration movement in Africa is explained before 
observing the numerous challenges that have been encountered. The way forward for 
digital trade in Africa shall be touched upon, before a formal suggestion is proposed 
in the subsequent chapter, by analysing whether a continental FTA or the regional 
economic communities (RECs) would be in the best position to further the 
development of digital trade.  
Chapter seven concludes, by summarising the main observations and making 
formal propositions that respond to the various challenges faced by Africa in the 
development of digital trade. The suggestions aim to not only address continental 
                                                        
11 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, 1998.  
12 The 11th Ministerial Conference 2017 held in Buenos Aires.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Statement by the African Group on the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, 20 October 
2017 (JOB/GC/144).  
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development but also take account of Africa’s position and capability to participate in 
the multilateral trading system within the realm of digital trade. As this paper will not 
be able to cover the entirety of the future potential of digital trade in Africa and the 
continuing relationship with development, some proposals will be put forward for 
further consideration.  
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Chapter Two: DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
2.1. Introduction  
Digital trade does not have a single, all-encompassing definition. E-commerce does 
not have a conclusive definition either and to further complicate matters the terms are 
often used interchangeably.15 Nevertheless, the various definitions and descriptions 
used by some of the main organizations and institutions shall be explored in order to 
establish what future regulations surrounding digital trade may include or exclude. 
These definitions are also relevant for measuring the form of trade and it has been 
established that a lack of consensus on the scope of these definitions does not bode 
well for an attempt to create accurate digital trade statistics.16 The general formation 
of a Free Trade Area (FTA) is discussed in terms of goods and services in order to 
understand the basic components of a potential digital FTA.  
 
2.2. Digital trade  
A narrow interpretation of the term digital trade only pertains to trade in actual 
‘digitized products.’17 It is clear that business’ needs surpass this interpretation and a 
broader view including the ‘use of digital technologies (ICTs) to conduct business’18 
would appear to be more suitable. McKinsey, in its research, has used ‘cross-border 
data flows’19 as a medium to calculate the growth of digital trade. This is exceptionally 
broad to the extent that it would even cover personal communications that are 
collected as a part of the data flow.  
It could be argued that the data flow approach is perhaps too inclusive, as 
defining digital trade in such a way goes against the basic definition of ‘trade’ itself, 
which presumes there is an exchange in the normal business context. A mere transfer 
of data does not equate to digital trade. If this were to be the case, digital trade would 
be a disastrous sphere inundated with irrelevant surplus information, not to mention 
the likelihood of uncontrollable privacy breaches. Due to the fact that the informing 
                                                        
15 UNESCAP ‘Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report 2016: Recent Trends and Developments’ 
(2016) ch 7 at 107, Box 7.1. 
16 Ibid at 105.  
17 Op cit note 15, Box 7.1. 
18 Ibid.  
19 James Manyika, Jacques Bughin & Susan Lund et al, ‘Global flows in a digital age: How trade, 
finance people, and data connect the world economy’ 2014 The McKinsey Global Institute at 11-13, 
as cited by UNESCAP ibid.  
 10 
literature often refers to e-commerce as opposed to digital trade, a few attempts at 
defining e-commerce shall be examined.  
 
2.3. E-commerce  
There are several definitions of e-commerce that seem to have similar basic attributes 
although they would yield different results if they were to be used for analysis in 
respect of growth and development. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), through 
the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce adopted in 1998,20 held that e-
commerce would be defined as the following: ‘Exclusively for the purposes of the 
work programme, and without prejudice to its outcome, the term 'electronic commerce' 
is understood to mean the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of 
goods and services by electronic means.’21 This definition is broad, non-specific and 
seemingly all-encompassing.   
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 
contrast, has adopted a slightly more limiting definition of e-commerce which is ‘the 
sale or purchase of goods or services, conducted over computer networks specifically 
designed for the purpose… the payment and the ultimate delivery of the goods or 
services do not have to be conducted online.’22 The OECD, unlike the WTO, excludes 
other aspects not specifically relating to sale and purchase, such as the production and 
advertising.  
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
follows suit in this regard and defines e-commerce as ‘purchases and sales conducted 
over computer networks, using multiple formats and devices, including the web and 
electronic data interchange… E-commerce can involve physical goods as well as 
intangible (digital) products and services that can be delivered digitally.’23  
 
                                                        
20 This is discussed at length in chapter four.  
21 Op cit note 15.  
22 Ibid at 106 
23 Ibid.  
 11 
2.4. Free trade areas for goods  
Free trade areas (FTAs) for goods exist as a part of the ‘regional trade exceptions’24 
which allow departures from certain WTO rules, most notably the MFN provision in 
Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, referred to as the GATT. A 
FTA is a region in which a group of countries have signed an agreement to have 
reduced or eliminated trade barriers, such as tariffs, between them while maintaining 
separate tariffs with countries that are not party to the agreement.25 Article XXIV(8)(b) 
of the GATT defines a FTA for goods as the following:  
A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs 
territories26 in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are 
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products 
originating in such territories.27 
A FTA can be distinguished from a customs union insofar as a customs union 
maintains a single common external tariff for all countries not party to the customs 
union, meaning the tariffs are not negotiated separately like they would be in a FTA.28 
A FTA can further be distinguished from a free trade zone, which is a duty free area 
that supplies ‘warehousing, storage, and distribution facilities for trade, transhipment, 
and re-export operations.’29 While developing countries are able to make use of the 
Enabling Clause to negotiate an agreement like an FTA under slightly more 
favourable terms, this would not be possible when a party to the agreement is a 
developed country.30  
The FTA is permitted if it meets the requirements outlined in article XXIV of 
the GATT31 and ‘if the formation of that FTA would be made impossible if the 
                                                        
24 Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: 
Text, Cases and Materials Textbook 4 ed (2017) 671. 
25 Article XXIV(8)(b) GATT 1994.  
26 A customs territory is defined by the GATT in article XXIV (2) as ‘any territory with respect to 
which separate tariffs or other regulations of commerce are maintained for a substantial part of the 
trade of such territory with other territories.’ 
27 Supra note 25.   
28 Article XXIV(8)(a) GATT 1994; op cit note 24 at 681 & 686.  
29 FIAS ‘Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone 
Development’ 2008 The World Bank Group Box 1 at 3.  
30 Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller participation of 
Developing Countries, 1979.  
31 Specifically, article XXIV(8)(b) & XXIV(5)(b) GATT 1994.  
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introduction of the measure concerned were not allowed.’32 Negotiators, while 
adhering to WTO requirements, have to remain aware of other international 
requirements that the parties may be obliged to follow in respect of various multilateral 
conventions, rendering the negotiation a lengthy and complicated process. Apart from 
the requisite adherence to the WTO rules, the parties to a FTA are able to determine 
the extent and content of such agreement without any hindrances. 
In order to create a FTA for goods, the parties to the agreement would need to 
decide on, amongst other things,  the appropriate mechanism to use in respect of the 
rules of origin.33 Rules of origin are used to determine, by the member countries, 
which products will be considered as having ‘originated’ from a specific member 
country and it is not an easy determination.34 During negotiations, the parties to the 
agreement would have to ensure that while eliminating such trade barriers for their 
own members they do not actually increase trade barriers against third parties.35 
Lastly, the WTO must always be notified of any decision or attempt to enter into a 
free trade agreement.36  
While there are lengthy debates as to the meaning of certain phrases used in 
the GATT provisions, they are not particularly important for our present discussion 
therefore only a brief explanation shall be provided for understanding. There is an 
Understanding on Article XXIV37 that originated from the Uruguay Rounds that 
provides further clarity on the criteria and procedural steps to be taken in relation to 
the article. Where it is required that trade barriers must be eliminated for ‘substantially 
all of the trade’38 between the members, it is understood that it does not mean 100 
percent of the trade. While this phrase continues to require further clarification,39 it 
has been observed over the years, that the distance between ‘substantially all of the 
trade’ and ‘all the trade’ has decreased significantly as more barriers have been 
                                                        
32 Op cit note 24 at 686. 
33 Ibid at 458; see Annex II to the Agreement on Rules of Origin.  
34 Ibid at 457.  
35 Article XXIV(5)(b) GATT 1994.  
36 Article XXIV(7)(a) GATT 1994.  
37 Understanding on the Interpretation of Articles XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, found in Annex 1 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization.  
38 Supra note 25.  
39 The phrase ‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’ in article XXIV(8)(b) also lacks clarity but it 
could be argued that a broad, inclusive interpretation should be favoured in terms of international 
trade. 
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eliminated in the regional integration efforts.40 It is generally accepted that an 
agreement covering 90 percent of trade is permissible.41  
 
2.5. Free trade areas for services   
FTAs for services generally follow the above-mentioned formation relating to an 
agreement concerning goods but there are, however, noteworthy differences. The 
agreement exists as an economic integration agreement, governed by article V of the 
General Agreements on Trade in Services, referred to as the GATS. The liberalisation 
of trade in services is permitted in this way, if the agreement has ‘substantial sectoral 
coverage.’42 In addition, such an agreement must:  
(b)  provide(s) for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, 
in the sense of Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors 
covered under subparagraph (a), through: 
(i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or 
(ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, either at the entry 
into force of that agreement or on the basis of a reasonable time-frame, except 
for measures permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.43 
These requirements in terms of services differ from those applicable to goods, 
as article V of the GATS does not require the elimination of the regulatory measures 
in their entirety – only for the elimination of discriminatory measures, presently 
existing and/or potentially in the future. In other words, the section calls for national 
treatment between members.44  
The requirement of ‘substantial sectoral coverage,’ similarly to ‘substantially 
all the trade,’ remains largely undefined although the footnote to the provision holds 
that it is to be ‘understood in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade affected and 
modes of supply. In order to meet this condition, agreements should not provide for 
the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply.’45 Upon satisfying the provisions, the 
                                                        
40 Op cit note 24, 28 & 32.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Article V(1)(a) GATS 1994.  
43 Article V(1)(b) GATS 1994.  
44 ‘Negotiating free trade agreements: a guide’ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian 
Government at 29.  
45 Footnote 1 of article V of GATS 1994.  
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members of the FTA in services would be able to favour each other and essentially 
discriminate against services and providers of such services from parties that are not 
covered by the FTA agreement.46 This, however, is subject to article V(6) which holds 
that service suppliers that are not party to the FTA agreement should enjoy the 
favourable treatment if they engage in ‘substantive business operations in the territory 
of the parties.’47 
The GATS provision regulating an FTA in services expressly acknowledges 
the positon of developing countries, while the GATT equivalent does not. Developing 
countries that are parties to an FTA agreement in services are granted flexibility in 
terms of meeting the requirements, in line with the developing countries’ sectoral and 
general level of development.48 Once again, the FTA in services should not, as a result 
of its formation, raise barriers towards third parties49 and the WTO must be notified 
of any attempts to form an FTA in services.50  
 
2.6. Conclusion  
While this paper does not aim to create the ideal definition of digital trade or e-
commerce, it is necessary to make a few observations. It is clear that e-commerce 
informs digital trade and that the two concepts cannot be completely distinguished 
which explains the conflation that exists in the literature. It has been seen that e-
commerce, as a term, has been used more widely and has been defined by several 
organizations, albeit for their specific purposes.51 It can be argued that digital trade, as 
a whole, remains somewhat broader than e-commerce,52 as the regulation and limits 
thereof have yet to been formally established, which is harmonious with the limitless 
nature of digital trade.  
                                                        
46 Article V(1) GATS 1994.  
47 ‘A service supplier of any other Member that is a juridical person constituted under the laws of a 
party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be entitled to treatment granted under such 
agreement, provided that it engages in substantive business operations in the territory of the parties to 
such agreement,’ see article V(6) GATS 1994.  
48 Article V(3) GATS 1994.  
49 Article V(4) GATS 1994.  
50 Article V(7) GATS 1994.  
51 For example, the definition used by the WTO in the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, op 
cit note 21.  
52 This is supported by the research of the Mckinsey Global Institute, op cit note 19.  
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As technological developments and advancements are fast paced and 
somewhat unpredictable, it would be recommended to prefer a broad and inclusive 
definition of e-commerce and digital trade. Many devices and networks are capable of 
transacting in e-commerce despite it not being their specific ‘purpose’ or ‘design.’53 It 
would be detrimental to exclude such networks and their capabilities, as it would 
exclude them from future regulatory frameworks. It would perhaps be more 
appropriate to define these terms in respect of what the proposed regulation aims to 
achieve, meaning institution-specific definitions may in fact be the most practical way 
forward in light of continuous technological developments. The broad approach to 
defining digital trade and e-commerce should take cognisance of previous attempts. 
While harmonisation across regulatory platforms is desirable, it would, however, be 
counterproductive to hinder the progression of the digital development as a result.  
With respect to the formation of an FTA, it is clear that the informing 
provisions may not be as simple as they appear. Lengthy negotiations would need to 
take place, not only in respect of the agreement but in order to determine the rules of 
origin mechanisms and calculations surrounding the actual reductions of trade 
barriers. The notion of the global value chain complicates these negotiations and 
placing these concepts in the digital sphere would only exacerbate the complexities. 
However, it can be observed that a FTA in services as opposed to goods may be easier 
to establish as the relevant rules are generally more lenient and specifically 
acknowledge the position of developing countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
53 This would be contrary to the OECD definition of e-commerce, op cit note 22.  
 16 
Chapter Three: FROM TRADITIONAL TRADE TO DIGITAL TRADE   
3.1. Introduction  
This chapter shall aim to give a brief overview of digital trade in the market, by 
considering the impact of Industry 4.0 on the traditional forms of trade and identifying 
the leading e-commerce companies internationally and within Africa specifically. The 
recent regulatory developments shall be observed before examining the notion of 
digital trade as a form of trade facilitation, which highlights the need to further the 
frameworks in support of digital trade.  
 
3.2. The impact of Industry 4.0 on trade in the market  
Recent developments in trade and the momentum of digital trade are propelled by the 
notion of the fourth industrial revolution. The latest revolution, presented as a concept 
in 2011,54 can be described as rapid change attributed to technological advances 
resulting in extreme connectivity, a merging of activities and an increased speed in all 
areas of production.55 What differentiates this revolution from previous ones, is the 
immeasurable advances technology itself can bring. A simple example of this would 
be the evolution of the mobile phone. When the first mobile phones were created, it 
was not envisaged or even hypothesised that the cameras in the phones would in the 
future be developed to scan barcodes as a method of payment, via an app that is linked 
to your online banking system. Physical and digital constructs are conflated as the 
internet of things56 and provide seamless interconnectivity in every sphere.   
The growth of technology is exponential, as opposed to other developments 
which typically follow a linear pattern.57 The benefits of such growth also develop 
exponentially and it is possible, if not probable, that the ‘rate of change itself is 
accelerating.’58 A defining feature of technology is the inconceivable possibility that 
                                                        
54 Andreja Rojka ‘Industry 4.0 Concept: Background and Overview’ (2017) 11 International Journal 
of Interactive Mobile Technologies 77 at 80.  
55 Klaus Schwap ‘The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond’ Word Economic 
Forum 14 January 2016, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-
revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/, accessed on 24 September 2018.  
56 Roblek, Maja Meško & Alojz Krapez ‘A Complex View of Industry 4.0’ 2016 SAGE Open 1.  
57 Ray Kurzweil ‘The Law of Accelerating Returns’ 2001, available at http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-
law-of-accelerating-returns, accessed on 24 September 2018.   
58 Ibid.   
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it holds within itself. The most successful businesses have utilised the benefits of 
technology to leverage themselves in the market.59  
Assessing the market for a particular sector would typically involve looking at 
the product dimension60 to identify potential substitutable goods or services and the 
geographical dimension61 to assess the scope of the potential competition. Upon 
defining the relevant market, one would be able to assess a firm’s market power.62 
However, this analysis becomes increasingly complex when evaluating products and 
services that fall within the scope of electronic commerce.63 The impact of electronic 
commerce, on both the product and geographical dimension, is significant as it has the 
potential to create limitless substitutability and blur the lines of the traditional physical 
scope.  
Internationally, Alibaba.com (Alibaba) and Amazon.com (Amazon) are 
innovative companies that are the competing leaders in the field of e-commerce, from 
China and America respectively.64 They have successfully used technological 
advancements to pursue not only interrelated business activities65  but other ventures 
such as cloud computing and data analytics. The e-commerce giants differ 
substantially both in their operations and objectives and have expanded in-line with 
the latter. It is interesting to note that Alibaba, for the most part, acts as an intermediary 
and a facilitator as it was envisioned and designed to empower SMEs in China.66  
In South Africa, it has been established that approximately 46 percent of 
shoppers use online platforms in 2018.67 Naspers, a broad-based multinational internet 
                                                        
59 Adam Rogers ‘Innovation Case Studies: How Companies Use Technology To Solidify A 
Competitive Advantage’ Forbes Technology Council 13 April 2018, available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/04/13/innovation-case-studies-how-companies-
use-technology-to-solidify-a-competitive-advantage/#26a7cd821410, accessed on 24 September 
2018.  
60 Kelly (ed), Unterhalter & Goodman et al Principles of Competition Law in South Africa (2017) 86.  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid at 83-4.  
63 Aleksandra Belousova Relevant Market: the application to the E-commerce area in the EU 
(unpublished Master Thesis, Aaurhus School of Business, 2010). 
64 See Alibaba, available at https://activities.alibaba.com/alibaba/following-about-
alibaba.php?spm=a2700.8293689.0.0.2ce265aa6LRSjp; and Amazon, available at 
https://www.aboutamazon.com, accessed on 24 September 2018.  
65 Amazon, in particular, has internalised many processes and developed its own logistics system.  
66 Feifei Xu Alibaba vs. Amazon: A business model comparison (unpublished Master Thesis, Louvain 
School of Management, 2016) 72. 
67 Ecommerce Forum Africa E-commerce Industry Report 2017, available at 
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2622125/2017%20South%20Africa%20E-
Commerce%20Industry%20Report.pdf, accessed on 24 September 2018.  
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and media group, have led the country’s e-commerce development by launching in 
South Africa in 1915.68 While it started as a print business, the group has expanded 
exponentially and operates in over 120 countries in varying sectors and services.69 
Takelot.com launched in 2011 and is known as South Africa’s largest e-commerce 
retailer which subsequently joined the Naspers group in 2015.70  
Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria, alongside South Africa, are at the forefront of e-
commerce on the African continent.71 Jumia is Nigeria’s largest e-commerce website 
that operates across 13 African countries, including Senegal.72 Like the 
abovementioned e-commerce companies, Jumia has expanded across various sectors. 
Jumia’s J-Force program is particularly innovative as it caters to the ‘populations that 
do not have access to internet’ and empowers individuals to become self-employed 
through the platform, whose vision is to change lives through the internet.73 Kilimall 
launched in 2014 and is Kenya’s largest e-commerce platform.74 Kilimall acts as a 
competitor to Jumia as it expanded its operations to Uganda and Nigeria after its 
success in Kenya.75  
While it is evident that e-commerce has been most prominently developed by 
the private sector, it shall be seen that cross-border regulations play an important role 
in furthering the development, especially in regions that remain unaffected by scope 
of the private sector’s e-commerce expansion. The global e-commerce developments 
mentioned above may indicate a movement away from the traditional forms of trade. 
However, it is clear that the former will not entirely replace the latter, as age old issues 
that are common to literature on trade are still being experienced in the digital sphere.76 
                                                        
68 Naspers, available at https://www.naspers.com/about#nasperscompanies, accessed on 24 
September 2018.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Takealot.com, available at https://www.takealot.com/about/our-journey accessed on 24 September 
2018.  
71 This is based upon the Internet’s contribution to the country’s GDP. See Exhibit E3 in Manyika, 
Cabral & Moodley et al ‘Lions go digital: The Internet’s transformative potential in Africa’ 2013 
McKinsey Global Institute 5.  
72 Jumia, available at https://www.jumia.com.ng/about_us/, accessed on 24 September 2018. 
73 Tech Moran ‘J-Force program aim to create 20,000 jobs for Kenyan youths by year-end’ available 
at https://techmoran.com/jumia-says-its-j-force-program-to-create-20000-jobs-for-kenyan-youths-by-
year-end/ accessed on 24 September 2018.  
74 Kilimall, available at https://www.kilimall.co.ke, accessed on 24 September 2018.   
75 Ibid.  
76 Javier Lôpez-González & Marie-Agnès Jouanjean ‘Digital Trade: Developing a Framework for 
Analysis’ 2017 OECD Trade Policy Papers 18.  
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Theories behind international trade are still applicable to the developments in cross 
border transactions.  
Digitalisation and new technologies change how we trade but not why we trade. That 
is, trade is still subject to comparative advantage, and informational asymmetries and 
barriers to trade both at-the-border and behind-the-border continue to apply. 
However, new technologies, reducing the cost of sharing ideas across borders and 
connecting different actors along the value chain, are helping overcome many of the 
constraints associated with engaging in international markets, shifting sources of 
comparative advantage and leading to the adoption of new business models.77 
Industry 4.0 has fundamentally influenced every aspect of life and it is 
therefore not surprising that the subsequent impact on trade operations are expansive 
and potentially limitless. Alongside these world-wide developments, is the need to re-
evaluate and critique the established mechanisms in place that regulate and govern a 
system. It can be said that digital trade, as it stands, is not unregulated or even self-
regulated. Various formulations of Free Trade Agreements have actually included 
elements of digital trade, albeit to the extent that it serves the parties’ purpose.78 The 
inclusion of such provisions would be seen as natural and in line with progressions 
made in the pursuit of free trade. 
 
3.3. Regulating digital trade through the use of digital free trade areas 
While this paper shall aim to focus on the prospects of a digital FTA at a continental 
level in Africa from a developmental perspective, it is motivated by the recent related 
developments concerning digital trade most notably by COMESA (the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and Malaysia.  
COMESA announced at the end of 2017 that the plans for a Digital FTA had 
been finalised.79 The COMESA Digital FTA has been modelled on the Malaysian 
equivalent and aims to utilise the relevant technology to assist with importing and 
exporting and the associated physical restraints present at borders. The Digital FTA is 
divided into e-regulation, e-logistics and e-trade and includes ‘an electronic certificate 
                                                        
77 Ibid at 8.  
78 FTA’s that regulate digital trade shall be discussed shortly and again in the following chapters.  
79 COMESA ‘Digital Free Trade Area Instrument Ready for Trials in MS’ available at 
http://www.comesa.int/digital-free-trade-area-instruments-to-be-piloted-in-ms/, accessed on 24 
September 2018.  
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of origin, underpinned by blockchain technology and a mobile application for cross-
border traders.’80 From 2018, the plans were to be carried out by the majority of the 
member states81 ‘on the basis of the principle of variable geometry.’82 
COMESA’s Digital FTA is the first of its kind for Africa and holds much 
promise for the future of digital trade regulation across the continent, as one regional 
economic community’s actions often influence the others.83 While the plans are 
largely supported, they do not come without concerns and risks relating to the 
constraint of COMESA’s resources and the progressive ambitions of the digital FTA 
itself.84 Further, the transition to a digital form of trade is evidently not an expeditious 
process, as COMESA’s electronic certificate of origin was finalised in 2017 yet it had 
been an on-going process since 2014.85  
It is held that COMESA’s Digital FTA is modelled on Malaysia’s Digital Free 
Trade Zone (DFTZ) which is an initiative launched in 2017 with Alibaba.86 The DFTZ 
is a project aimed at strengthening Malaysia’s position as a ‘regional e-commerce e-
fulfilment hub’87 that utilizes e-commerce to promote the exporting of Malaysian 
small and medium size enterprises’ products while simultaneously attracting 
investment.88 Alongside Alibaba, the DFTA has partnered with Lazada Malaysia, 
eRomman, and eBay which constitute the ‘e-Marketplace’89 with an intercontinental 
reach. While there are already notable differences between Malaysia’s DFTZ and 
COMESA’s Digital FTA relating to the objectives and capabilities of the regions, the 
mere existence of regulatory frameworks for digital trade highlights the potential 
prosperity for developing countries in varying regions.90  
                                                        
80 Ashley Hope ‘What is COMESA’s Digital Free Trade Area and should SADC have one too?’ 2018 
Tralac Trade Brief 3.  
81 Op cit note 79. The 15 out of 19 COMESA states that are participating are Burundi, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Seychelles, Uganda, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
82 Op cit note 80 at 1.  
83 Ibid at 9-10. Due to multiplicity of membership, the activity of one REC often influences another 
eg. COMESA and SADC.  
84 Ibid at 10.  
85 Op cit note 79.  
86 Go Global with DFTZ, available at https://mydftz.com/programs/go-global-with-dftz/, accessed on 
24 September 2018.  
87 DFTZ, available at https://mydftz.com, accessed on 24 September 2018.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Op cit note 86.  
90 Despite Malaysia’s economic growth and development, it is still presently classified as a 
developing country. See The World Bank in Malaysia, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia, accessed on 24 September 2018.  
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3.4. Digital trade in pursuit of trade facilitation  
It is interesting to take note of how different countries manage their digital trade, in 
respect of how ‘open’ they are, in pursuit of trade facilitation in the digital sphere. 
While digital restrictiveness can be measured in various ways, the Digital Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (DTRI) analyses over 100 categories of policy measures from 
64 different countries.91 The DTRI results are centred around four clusters,92 with one 
of them being Trading Restrictions which covers quantitative trade restrictions, 
standards, online sales and transactions.93  
China is found to be the most digitally restrictive country while New Zealand 
is found to be the most ‘open’ based upon the rankings across the identified clusters.94 
The only African countries to be included in the DTE database are Nigeria and South 
Africa, who ranked 16th and 17th respectively.95 As the first ranking represents the 
most digitally restrictive country and the 64th ranking the most digitally free, one can 
ascertain that the African hegemonic countries fall approximately within the top 
quarter of the most digitally restrictive nations. The report holds that the increased 
digital restrictiveness of emerging economies is concerning, as it inhibits the countries 
from benefitting from the prosperity found in the ‘data-based global economy’96 and 
the digital restrictions will also have negative consequences for the non-digital 
economy.  
The divergences between the digitally restrictive emerging economies and the 
digitally open more developed countries, alongside Africa’s absence from the study, 
highlights the lack of developing-country participation in the sphere of digital trade. 
From a wider regulatory perspective, it can also be seen that every other continent has 
a fairly substantial number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) that include the 
regulation of digital trade, apart from Africa.97 The RTA classification covers FTAs 
and customs unions. As of 2017, twenty-nine developing countries had participated in 
                                                        
91 Martina Francesca Ferracane, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama & Erik van der Marel ‘Digital Trade 
Restrictiveness Index’ ECIPE April 2018.  
92 Ibid at 11, the clusters are Fiscal Restrictions, Establishment Restrictions, Restrictions on Data and 
Trading Restrictions. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid at 14, Table 2.1.  
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid at 5. 
97 ICTSD ‘Updating the Multilateral Rule Book on E-Commerce’ (2018) Policy Brief Figure 3 at 4.  
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negotiations at this level98 and even with the hypothetical inclusion of COMESA’s 
recent Digital FTA initiative and the limited North African RTA participation seen 
below, Africa’s absence would still be striking in comparison.  
 
Figure 1. Number of RTAs that contain e-commerce provisions, by country.99  
 
 
 
While Africa’s lack of RTA regulation may, amongst other factors, merely 
reflect its limited participation in digital trade, there are particular consequences 
attached to this consideration when one views digital trade as a method of trade 
facilitation. Digitisation brings clear benefits in terms of accessibility, speed and 
connectivity. Many processes involved in importation and exportation can become 
paperless, resulting in improved faster clearance procedures.100 While barriers will 
still exist for the delivery of physical goods, the related promotion and sale of the 
good, amongst other things, could potentially be conducted online.101  
                                                        
98 Ibid at 3.   
99 Ibid, ICTSD based on Wu (2017). This figure does not include COMESA’s recent Digital FTA 
formation.  
100 Kati Suominen ‘Fuelling Trade in the Digital Era: Policy Roadmap for Developing Countries’ 
2017 ICTSD Digital Economy 17-9. 
101 Ibid.  
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Although Africa’s digital capabilities in terms of regulation may seem dire 
based upon the above, it is clear that the private sector has successfully used e-
commerce to expand their operations across the continent, albeit with a focus on 
certain countries.102 As digital trade is evidently a progression from traditional forms 
of trade, influenced by Industry 4.0, it is crucial to Africa’s development that further 
cross-border regulation is explored within the realm of digital trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
102 Ibid at 14. This is not to say that there has been no other digital development on the continent, but 
to emphasize the comparable achievements of the private sector. Other related digital regulatory 
developments are i) the East African Community Task Force on Cyberlaws; ii) ECOWAS’ 
harmonisation of e-transactions, data protection and cybercrime; and iii) the Digital 2027 Agenda of 
SADC.  
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Chapter Four: WTO PROVISIONS ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
4.1. Introduction  
Multilateral trading rules are essential to the functioning of international trade despite 
the challenges the multilateral system has faced.103 These general rules are often the 
results of lengthy negotiations held at the World Trade Organization (WTO), in 
Geneva, and adopted at its Ministerial Conferences. The WTO, as the only global 
international organization engaging with multilateral rules at this level, promotes the 
rules in pursuit of predictable free trade.104 It is therefore only natural, that one would 
look to the WTO for guidance in developing a regulatory framework for electronic 
commerce relating to international trade.  
The Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce was adopted in May 1998 at 
the Second Ministerial Conference in Geneva,105 a mere three years after the WTO 
itself was founded in 1995. This section will examine the steps taken by the WTO in 
respect of electronic commerce with a general focus on developmental considerations 
from 1998, when the Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce was adopted, to 
2017 when the most recent Ministerial Conference was held in Buenos Aires. 
Although the work of the WTO cannot be examined in its entirety, this chapter aims 
to select and review the most important considerations in respect of electronic 
commerce that could be useful in assessing the general regulatory issues present in 
digital free trade areas for developing countries.  
 
4.2. The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce  
The Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce instructed the General Council to 
form a Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, hereafter referred to as the Work 
Programme, which would function as a system evaluating the trade related issues that 
arise in electronic commerce within the multilateral system.106 The identified issues 
were not a closed list107 and members were able to address their own issues relating to 
trade and electronic commerce through the Work Programme. While the General 
                                                        
103 Ann Capling & Richard Higgott ‘Introduction: The future of the multilateral trade system – what 
role for the World Trade Organization?’ (2009) 15 Global Governance 313-325.  
104 The WTO ‘About the WTO’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm, 
accessed on 23 July 2018.  
105 Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce (WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2.) 
106 Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (WT/L/274) para 1.1.  
107 Ibid.  
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Council played a pivotal role in actually establishing the Work Programme and 
continues to periodically review it,108 four core WTO bodies were tasked with the 
implementation thereof, being the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for Trade 
in Goods, the Council for TRIPS, and the Committee for Trade and Development.109 
The Work Programme identified several issues that each of the four bodies should 
address respectively and the term electronic commerce,110 as opposed to digital trade 
is utilised, as discussed in the previous chapter.111  
The Council for Trade in Services, the Council for Trade in Goods, the Council 
for TRIPS, and the Committee for Trade and Development took the suggested list of 
issues further and provided feedback on their respective progress and developments, 
by way of various notes and reports.112 It is helpful to observe the advancements that 
have been made, as they inform the present task of outlining the developing countries 
position in international trade within the sphere of digital trade. For this purpose, 
selected generalised issues from the Council for Trade in Services and the Council for 
Trade in Goods shall be briefly examined before evaluating the submissions of the 
Committee for Trade and Development at length.113 
 
4.2.1. The Council for Trade in Services: Progress Report to the General Council 
The Council for Trade in Services, in line with the GATS provisions, was called upon 
to examine various issues to the extent they are related to electronic commerce.114  A 
Progress Report was adopted following the Interim Report, by the Council for Trade 
in Services in 1999, one year after the Work Programme’s formation. The Progress 
Report identified various common understandings as solutions to the listed issues in 
                                                        
108 Ibid para 1.2. 
109 Ibid para 2.1 – 5.1.  
110 ‘Exclusively for the purposes of the work programme, and without prejudice to its outcome, 
the term "electronic commerce" is understood to mean the production, distribution, marketing, sale or 
delivery of goods and services by electronic means,’ op cit note 21.   
111 Ibid.  
112 The Council for Trade in Services’ Progress Report to the General Council, The Council for Trade 
in Goods’ Interim Review of Progress and The Committee for Trade and Development’s Note Issued 
by the Secretariat will be examined.  
113 The Council for TRIPS’ work shall not be considered as it is not as pertinent to the consideration 
at hand.  
114 Op cit note 106 para 2.1. 
 26 
the Work Programme while recognizing which issues would need additional 
consideration in order to find such acceptable solutions.115  
With respect to the scope of the GATS in relation to the electronic delivery of 
services, it was held that Article 1 did indeed apply to all services with delivery 
occurring under the four modes of supply,116 although confusion arose in 
distinguishing certain modes.117 There was a call for further clarification in terms of 
the arguments made asserting that all products that are delivered electronically can be 
classified as services. The disagreeing delegations identified instances where the 
electronic delivery of products would not be considered services, rendering other 
provisions applicable in place of the GATS.118  
The Council for Trade in Services held that the GATS MFN obligation is 
applicable to the electronic supply of services, while acknowledging the complex role 
that ‘likeness’ may have in this regard.119 While there are varying arguments to be 
made in terms of determining what is ‘like’ in any given context, there seemed to be 
a general consensus that ‘likeness’ does not require a certain mode of delivery - 
meaning an electronically delivered service may, in some instances, be ‘like’ a service 
delivered in a different way.120 
The issue of developing country participation was largely addressed by the 
Council for Trade in Services by advocating for the implementation of Article IV of 
the GATS, furthering trade liberalisation and market access.121 While reference was 
made to inadequate resources, delegations highlighted the need for substantial fiscal 
policies in support of electronic commerce.122 The Council for Trade in Services lastly 
emphasised the work of UNCTAD and the Committee on Trade and Development in 
respect of promoting developing country participation and recommended that the 
various parties should make use of the progress these bodies have made, while 
                                                        
115 Progress Report to the General Council (S/L/74) para 1.  
116 Ibid para 4.  
117 Ibid.  
118 Ibid para 6.  
119 Ibid para 7-8. 
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid para 10.  
122 Ibid.  
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suggesting that these bodies take the issue of internet infrastructure into 
consideration.123  
The Council for Trade in Services aimed to respond to the issues involving 
customs duties and classification. It became clear that member states may wish to 
establish how customs duties could apply to services if they do, and how customs 
duties would apply to electronic services.124 There was also, as a result of the lack of 
clarity on this point, disagreement regarding the future of the standstill on customs 
duties.125  
On the issue of classification, it was observed above that the GATS does not 
differentiate between services provided electronically and services provided by other 
methods and that many products delivered electronically are essentially services.126 
However, despite this, there was uncertainty as to whether products, even if classified 
as services, would be subject to full MFN and national treatment requirements as well 
as the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.127 While it was agreed that no product 
would fall outside the ambit of a WTO agreement, there was an interesting suggestion 
that some ‘products’ such as downloaded files may be neither a good nor a service in 
certain instances.128 While this suggestion may be open for discussion, it was agreed 
and concluded that electronic commerce itself would create very few, if any, ‘new’ 
services in line with GATS and the Services Sectoral Classification List.129  
 
4.2.2. The Council for Trade in Goods: Interim Review of Progress  
The Council for Trade in Goods, in line with the GATT 1994 provisions, was similarly 
called upon to examine the various issues, to the extent they are related to electronic 
commerce.130 The Council for Trade in Goods complied with the requirement of 
response131 by way of submitting the Chairman’s Summary of Discussions,132 which 
                                                        
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid para 22.  
125 Ibid para 23.  
126 Ibid para 24.  
127 Ibid para 25.  
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid para 26.  
130 Market access, valuation issues in respect of Article VII, application issues in respect of the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, customs duties and other charges in line with Article II, 
the standards for electronic commerce, rules of origin issues and classification issues. 
131 Op cit note 106 para 1.2. 
132 Chairman’s Summary of the Discussions held in the CTG (G/C/W/158).  
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would inform the Interim Review of Progress, encapsulating the relevant discussions 
of three informing meetings up until 1999, a year after the Work Programme’s 
formation.  
The delegations noted, from the outset, the difficulty in defining electronic 
commerce and further the innately evolving nature of this form of trade, rendering any 
concrete definition inadequate in time.133 It was held, that the WTO provisions relating 
to goods would subsequently be relevant where an electronic transmission’s content 
could be classified as a good.134 However, as it was observed above in relation to the 
discussion on trade in services, many delegations support the idea that electronic 
transmissions are to be considered as services and not as goods - the GATS is 
‘technology neutral’135 which appeals to many. It was even questioned in meetings if 
the content and supply of an electronic transmission could be separated, where the 
former would be a good and the latter a service.136 It was concluded that these 
classifications would only be even more impractical to adhere to in practice than it is 
to conceptualize them in theory, which left the classification question largely 
unanswered and the actual value in the possible solution questioned.137  
While the issue of the standstill agreement was raised again in respect of 
customs duties and other duties and charges, it was held that the prior agreement would 
not be detrimental to the progress of the Work Programme.138 Despite the confusion 
that may exist between the understanding of the Council for Trade in Services report 
and the Council for Trade in Goods report, the latter seemed to conclude that goods 
would be subject to existing WTO rules for the trade in goods when they are physically 
delivered across border, even when the goods are sold online.139  
The customs duties issues led to a more in-depth consideration of 
classification, in terms of the harmonised system, commonly referred to as the HS.140 
It is clear, that digitalization complicates various aspects of traditional classification 
and the Council for Trade in Goods may not be in the best position to examine the 
                                                        
133 Ibid para 2.1.  
134 Ibid para 2.3.  
135 Ibid para 2.5.  
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137 Ibid para 2.8 & 2.11.  
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139 Ibid para 4.2.   
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issues to their full extent. In lieu of this, delegations took issue with the use of HS as 
it would not be applicable to the classification of electronic transmissions, if they are 
to be understood as services.141 Further, if the HS’ purpose was to collect the relevant 
custom duties, the standstill that is in place would render this purpose redundant.142  
The issues relating to rules of origin were held to be dependent upon the 
outcome of many of the above-mentioned concerns, as rules of origin by nature aim 
to enforce various policies of trade.143 Parties did, however, propose that the 
Agreement on Rules of Origin would perhaps apply if electronic transmissions were 
understood to constitute as goods. Despite the possible applicability of the Agreement, 
there were apprehensions towards using rules of origin as transmissions, generally, are 
not ‘point-to-point transmissions.’144 The ‘fluidity’ of electronic transmissions in 
general was once again raised as a prevailing factor and was described as ‘the flow of 
constantly evolving pieces, of functionality, processing and communication.’145  
It is generally accepted in international trade, that the rules and procedures that 
have been developed should not themselves act as further barriers to trade. This 
underlying goal was examined in light of standards in relation to electronic 
commerce.146 Particular to electronic commerce, is the need for standards in respect 
of both the good (or service) and the actual form of the transfer.147 The adequacy of 
such standards was found to correlate to and impact upon secondary issues such as 
flaws within standardization which allow for various groupings to form within the 
loopholes.148 On the point of input from developing countries in standardization 
efforts it was heard that although the standards of the ISO and IEC were reached by 
consensus in respect of the TBT agreement, participation by developing countries and 
small and medium sized enterprises are essential to the system’s functioning. 
Increased participation in the standardization process leads to ‘interoperability, 
connectivity, and access to platforms for electronic commerce’ for these parties 
specifically.149  
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An opposing view on the topic of standards in relation to electronic commerce 
held that regulation in the form of the above-mentioned standardization would not 
achieve its desired purpose and would hinder the actual development of e-commerce 
and the associated digital developments that perhaps have not been fully realised.150 
Consequentially, the two broadly competing arguments need to be taken into account 
when assessing the best approach to standardization in electronic commerce. While 
this point of contention forms a fundamental question of the existence and 
development of e-commerce in the global world, it was however concluded and 
accepted that the WTO and its divisions shall not be able to regulate e-commerce in 
its entirety and that the devised rules and regulations are to have a more general 
application and effect. As a result, the WTO should avoid setting such specific 
standards for electronic commerce.151  
In respect of development, which shall be discussed at length in the following 
chapter, a delegation highlighted the need to consider developmental concerns in light 
of electronic commerce and particularly the impact the ‘new’ rules, regulations and 
systems may have on the more conventional forms of trading in these countries.152 Yet 
again, there was a discussion on whether the continued growth of electronic commerce 
would indeed displace the status quo in such a negative way or whether the 
developments may, in fact, lead to further trade creation and potential prosperity for 
developing economies. Several issues that were deemed in need of further discussion 
carried great weight for developing countries.153 
The Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods noted, in conclusion, that 
many of the above-mentioned issues and concerns could only be discussed effectively 
once there had been clarification on the overarching issue of the nature of electronic 
transmissions – being whether they are services or goods or perhaps even something 
in-between.154 The classification issue of electronic transmissions is a ‘trade related 
issue(s) of cross-cutting nature’155 which the General Council itself shall consider. 
                                                        
150 Ibid para 8.2.   
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid para 10.1.  
153 Ibid para 8.1.   
154 Ibid para 11.1. 
155 Ibid.  
 31 
Nevertheless, the identified issues were to be continually discussed and reviewed by 
the Council for Trade in Goods.  
 
4.2.3. The Committee for Trade and Development: A Note issued by the Secretariat 
The Committee for Trade and Development, by nature, was tasked with an extensive 
list of issues concerning the developmental implications of electronic commerce and 
was to acknowledge the varying financial, developmental and trade needs of the 
developing countries.156 A Note was issued by the Secretariat in 1998 to guide the 
Committee on Trade and Development with its discussions.157 Once again, the 
identified list of issues was not intended to act as an exhaustive list but serves as a 
useful tool, particularly for our purpose, in starting the process of assessing the 
developmental impact electronic commerce has had over the years.  
It is noted from the outset, that the mere access to the necessary 
telecommunication systems is, perhaps the ‘defining element’158 of electronic 
commerce. This is undoubtedly of great importance to developing countries and shall 
be explored in light of other developmental concerns present in electronic commerce. 
As with any new system, electronic commerce carries both potential benefits and 
plausible problems which need to be objectively assessed in order to formulate an 
advantageous way forward for these delegations.159 The benefits are broadly obtained 
from the new technological advancements themselves alongside the interrelated 
developments, and the concerns are directly connected in a sense that there may exist 
‘physical, economic, juridical and policy constraints’160 which deter such developing 
nations from taking advantage of the global technological developments. Knowledge, 
information and investment161 are perhaps only the initial necessities required to 
establish oneself in the sphere of electronic commerce.  
The Note states that electronic commerce may assume the position of a 
substitute162 to traditional trade forms, as an addition163 to the established structure, or 
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as a complementary system164 to the conventional approach. Understanding electronic 
commerce as an additional form may be valuable for developing countries in 
particular. Where countries are hampered by a lack of physical resources, adequate 
transport and financial restraints – electronic commerce has not only the potential but 
also an advantageous position in circumventing these issues to provide for new trade 
opportunities.165 The listed examples by Secretariat on this point extend to ‘trade in 
on-line education services, medical services, consulting services and databanks 
retrievals.’166 Although appealing, it was held that electronic commerce cannot 
alleviate all the issues of the developing countries in the traditional form, specifically 
that of the supply capability of the developing country’s domestic market.167 
Following on from the general benefits of electronic commerce for developing 
countries, are the specific identified benefits for the consumers of such countries.168  
The digitized world naturally allows for information to become more accessible, 
meaning consumers would be able to gather information to accurately inform their 
purchases. With an increased availability and variety of products, competition will 
increase between producers and ultimately benefit consumers by the associated 
lowered costs.169 Of particular importance to the consumers of developing countries 
may be the notion of reduced delivery costs. When compared to the products of 
developed countries, the cost in producing a developing country product is typically 
more heavily impacted by increased delivery costs.170  
The Note identified similar benefits for developing country producers as the 
ones for the consumers which may prove specifically invaluable for small and medium 
size enterprises.171 As many products may still require physical delivery, delivery 
services and other interrelated systems will benefit from the increased demand while 
creating further export growth.172 The use of electronic commerce may also increase 
the competition for domestic producers as foreign companies may be able to utilize 
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the system to their benefit. Thus, developing countries are encouraged to ‘prepare 
themselves’173 for this eventuality.  
Physical infrastructure requirements for conducting electronic commerce can 
be identified as, but are not limited to ‘a well-functioning, modern telecommunication 
infrastructure and a satisfactory distribution of electricity,’ as well as ‘access to 
computer hardware, software and servers.’174 There are naturally different spheres of 
electronic commerce that require varying systems and infrastructures. It was found, as 
expected, that developing countries lack much of the required infrastructure when 
compared to the structural capabilities of the more developed countries.175 The same 
can be said when one compares the levels of accessibility.176 
Related to the infrastructural requirements is the need to enhance the 
availability of such necessities. The Note observes the importance of capital 
investments177 and the initial exorbitant costs that are involved. Policy factors178 are 
identified as contributing factors in regulating and reducing the associated costs of 
accessing the internet and related technological developments.179 
The human infrastructure requirements for electronic commerce are deemed 
to be different to those involved in other spheres of trade as the need for specific 
skills180 will only increase as electronic commerce advances.181 It is observed, that 
developing countries will inherently lack the required human infrastructure182 which 
leads to a consideration of the resultant effects on education and training in the affected 
countries. From the outset, the effect of electronic commerce in the education sector 
is construed as positive not only in terms of the actual information but also in the 
facilitation of learning – as distance learning becomes a viable possibility.183 Despite 
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the positive outlook, it is noted that the benefits will not be immediate and the need 
for access and ‘extensive basic education’184 will still be prerequisites. 
The Note considers the effects of electronic commerce on employment in 
developing countries. Once again, developments in electronic commerce may act as a 
substitute and see a decline in employment opportunities in terms of the traditional 
forms of trade with an exception being employment in the delivery sector.185 
Accordingly, there would be an increase in the employment opportunities in the 
associated sectors of electronic commerce.186 Of particular value to developing 
countries, may be the employment opportunities in the services sector.187 
While the Note does not go as far as to say that electronic commerce would 
result in an automatic transfer of technology from developed to developing countries, 
it does hold that the participation will naturally result in a sharing of knowledge and 
technology.188 When a developing country embraces these new developments, it is 
suggested that the economy would become more favourable to foreign investors as the 
typical curtailments, such as the mere physical distance, would be less deterring.189 It 
is held further, that ‘losses in government revenue should be considered in light of the 
gains that may arise.’190 In conclusion it was observed, however, that most developing 
countries do not have regulatory frameworks in place to facilitate electronic 
commerce, as opposed to the developed countries who are more advanced in terms of 
their legislative structures.191  
 
4.3. Ministerial Decisions on the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce  
The Geneva Ministerial Conference in 1998 adopted the Declaration on Global 
Electronic Commerce, as participants recognized the potential of electronic commerce 
in international trade.192 The Declaration, as it was stated previously, required the 
General Council to formulate the Work Programme. At each subsequent Ministerial 
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Conference, the General Council was required to periodically review the progress that 
had been made in respect of electronic commerce and report back at the next 
Ministerial Conference. Since 1988, Members have continuously agreed to uphold the 
current position in terms of not imposing customs duties on electronic 
transmissions.193 
The Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 was the fourth session of the WTO 
and the Ministerial Declaration took note of the need to develop the environment to 
facilitate further development in electronic commerce.194 The Doha Ministerial 
Conference required the General Council to assess which bodies of the WTO may be 
in the best position to advance the progress of the Work Programme.195  
The Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005 aimed to further the 
development considerations of the Doha Work Programme by continuing the relevant 
negotiations.196 In respect of electronic commerce, it was held that although the issues 
identified in the Work Programme had not yet been resolved, the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference agreed to strengthen it and the developmental concerns were 
mentioned specifically, albeit briefly.197 The relationship between trade and 
technology was acknowledged, and the Ministers supported the need to facilitate an 
increase in technology in developing countries.198 
The Geneva Ministerial Conference in 2009 held that the Work Programme’s 
progress was a cause for concern as many of the identified issues had not yet been 
resolved.199  The Geneva Ministerial Conference in 2011 repeated many of the 
previous aspirations in relation to electronic commerce and specifically called upon 
the General Council to focus on the development considerations. To achieve this, the 
Committee for Trade and Development was required to observe and evaluate 
‘development-related issues such as technical assistance, capacity building, and the 
facilitation of access to electronic commerce by micro, small and medium sized 
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enterprises, including small producers and suppliers, of developing countries and 
particularly of least-developed country Members.’200 
The above was echoed yet again at the Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013 
and the issues of internet access and connectivity where emphasised.201 The Nairobi 
Ministerial Conference in 2015 aimed to continue with the developments under the 
Work Programme until the next meeting, which was the Buenos Aires Ministerial 
Conference in 2017.202 While the Buenos Aires Ministerial Decision repeated the 
agreement to continue with the Work Programme, there were interesting 
developments regarding the possibility of launching new negotiations on the topic of 
e-commerce.203 Although almost half of the participating delegations comprised of 
both developing and developed countries called for new negotiations on the subject,204 
certain delegations, most notably the African Group and India, did not consent to the 
idea and preferred to continue with the Work Programme of 1998. As a result, the 
countries in favour of renewing electronic commerce opted to begin with ‘exploratory 
work’205 that may aid future WTO negotiations on the subject.  
 
4.4. Observations of the WTO work on electronic commerce  
While the ability of the WTO to effectively adapt to modern technological 
developments may be critiqued,206 there is still value in observing its position on e-
commerce. At the very least, the WTO provisions and developments thus far can be 
interpreted as a point of departure for future negotiations on the topic of e-commerce. 
In addition to the above-mentioned work of the various WTO bodies in respect of the 
Work Programme, The General Council held periodic Dedicated Discussions which 
have seemed to consolidate the WTO bodies’ observations ahead of the Ministerial 
Conferences and consider further country specific submissions.207 It is clear that the 
various issues in electronic commerce were more effectively explored through  using 
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the platforms of the Work Programme bodies, as opposed to the negotiations of the 
Ministerial Conferences.  
Various issues, such as technical classifications of certain aspects of electronic 
commerce remain unresolved between the Council for Trade in Services, the Council 
for Trade in Goods and the Committee for Trade and Development.208 While the 
bodies can be commended for identifying many of the related and interlinked 
considerations, the Work Programme’s objective of finding acceptable solutions to the 
concerns has not fully materialised.209  
  In respect of the developmental concerns in electronic commerce, the work of 
the bodies should be viewed in light of the fact that the majority of the efforts were 
initiated in the late 1990’s, when developing countries did not yet possess their 
increased bargaining power that they have gained over the years. Despite this, the 
Council for Trade in Services’ approach to developing country participation, by 
promoting increased trade liberalisation and market access without considering the 
primary needs of developing countries, can be inherently critiqued from a 
developmental perspective and shall be elaborated upon in the following chapter. 
The work of the WTO bodies highlights the possibilities and opportunities in 
electronic commerce for the developed and developing economies and holds, for the 
most part, that the benefits outweigh the associated risks and costs. An interesting 
observation of the Committee for Trade and Development, which is worth further 
consideration for our purpose, is the fact that electronically traded services, as opposed 
to goods, may circumvent some of the typical issues for developing nations. As 
developing country participation in the multilateral trading system has gradually 
increased over the years, culminating at the most recent Ministerial Conference of 
2017 in Buenos Aires, it is now appropriate to consider their arguments and concerns, 
specifically of the African Group, relating to their participation in cross border 
electronic commerce.  
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Chapter Five: DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONCERNS IN LIGHT OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL TRADE 
5.1. Introduction 
Developing countries have various concerns regarding their participation, or lack 
thereof, in digital trade. Where such nations are in a position to partake in global e-
commerce, they remain apprehensive of the consequences of partaking in the digital 
form of trade as it shall be seen that the benefits may not be equally distributed. The 
concerns of the developing countries have a domestic and international dimension, 
where the internal consequences directly affect the relevant economy and the external 
fears relate to the capabilities of said economy to interact transnationally at a global 
level. The traditional barriers to trade are directly linked to the fundamental systems 
and infrastructures that are needed for a country to develop digitally whereas the latter 
apprehension reflects upon the role of developing countries in the multilateral trading 
system and the growth of their position globally.  
These concerns shall be examined after establishing the developing countries’ 
position in the multilateral trading system, as it is relevant to their apprehensions to 
the advancement of digital trade. The submissions of the African Group to the WTO 
will be examined as they encapsulate the above concerns and are a representation of 
the continent at a global, multilateral level.  
 
5.2. The position of developing countries in the multilateral trading system  
The WTO holds that it ‘provides a forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing 
obstacles to international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all, thus 
contributing to economic growth and development.’210 This has been critiqued, as 
there is a general consensus that developing countries’ needs have not been adequately 
addressed by the multilateral trading system. Some would even go so far as to question 
whether the developing nations would be better off without such an institution that has 
benefited the developed and upper-middle income economies to their exclusion.211 
While the WTO’s agenda exceeds the scope of this paper, it is relevant to briefly assess 
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the position of developing nations in the multilateral trading system and the growth 
that has occurred in recent years.  
At the start of the Doha Round, developing countries remained concerned that 
the negotiation would focus on furthering trade liberalisation for the developed 
economies and not address the developmental issues that hindered their participation 
in international trade.212 However, the Round became known as the Doha 
Development Agenda213 and is a significant progression for the developing countries’ 
position in the multilateral trading system. The improvements that have been made are 
certainly due to the formation of strong coalitions of developing nations – such as the 
G33, the African Group and NAMA 11 -  that have been able to voice their various 
developmental concerns in the international negotiating sphere.214 Regardless of the 
success of the Doha Development Agenda, the momentum of developing countries 
has evidently continued, based upon the African Group’s representation at the Buenos 
Aires Ministerial Conference in 2017. 
Thus the current and future generation of developing country trade negotiators will 
become increasingly curious about the role that developing countries played in GATT 
since its inception. Re-discovering the history of GATT will become an essential part of 
their attempts to shape the future architecture and content of the multilateral trading 
system.215  
The growth of the developing countries in the multilateral trading system, in both 
their representation and demands, is particularly relevant to the development of digital 
trade as they are able to contribute to the advancement at an important stage in the 
process, despite it being ten years since the initiation of the Work Programme.216   
 
5.3. The traditional barriers to trade in the digital sphere  
The developing countries apprehensions to digital trade are expectedly fairly obvious 
and are directly linked to their resource constraints and respective levels of 
development. While the new challenges of digital trade are significant, the traditional 
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barriers to trade remain the primary concern. The trade process can only be ‘digitised’ 
to a certain extent when dealing with tangible goods as they still require ordinary 
transportation. Physical barriers to trade between borders remain the biggest 
obstruction to effective importing and exporting, especially in Africa.217 The physical 
restraints not only impede the basic facilitation of trade and access to markets but also 
increase the associated costs by preventing expeditious delivery.218 Customs 
procedures, for both traditional and digital trade forms, are a related hindrance to the 
potential success of cross border trade in Africa.219 Structural inefficiencies combined 
with frequent misconduct render the logistical issue the ‘worst impediment’ for 
various African countries with differing levels of development.220 
The most fundamental requirement for digital trade is internet connectivity.221 
While smartphones have rapidly facilitated the access to internet across the world, it 
is the developing countries that remain somewhat ‘unconnected’ in comparison. This 
once again carries dire consequences for Africa in particular, as approximately only 
12 percent of the population in sub-Sarahan Africa benefits from such access to the 
internet.222 Once the tangible infrastructures have been established, software and other 
systems such a cloud computing would be required. 
Where broadband connection is available, limited access to finance prevents 
many firms from accessing the online market and it is particularly felt by SMEs in the 
African context which corresponds with the broader issue of the ‘global trade finance 
gap’223 that has drastic consequences for the growth of an export market.224 While 
financial technology itself can respond to the issue of trade finance to an extent,225 
developing nations would not yet be in a position to fully benefit from such a 
possibility.226  
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It is clear that based on the above, the gains from digital trade would not be 
automatic for developing countries that lack the required infrastructures. This is 
somewhat at odds with the exponential growth that is innate to the process of 
digitization and leaves developing countries in a predicament as to how best to proceed 
in the realm of digital trade.  
While there are as yet no theoretical and econometric models to specify the 
components of an optimal enabling environment for trade as digitisation progresses, 
it is clear that none of these facets is sufficient on its own; rather, all are necessary for 
the digital economy to function.227 
This leaves developing countries, and Africa as a continent, in a position where 
one has to navigate the inevitable development of digital trade without having the 
fundamental infrastructures in place to facilitate such advancement, hence the 
justifiable apprehensions. Even where the necessary arrangements exist, it shall be 
seen that success in digital trade is not guaranteed for these economies.  
 
5.4. The potential of furthering the digital divide  
The introduction of the digitised world may exacerbate the structural problems that 
exist and could potentially widen the ‘gap’ between the developing and the developed. 
This leads to the external fear of developing countries that increased participation in 
digital trade may have negative consequences for their socioeconomic development.  
The notion of the ‘second digital divide’ is relevant, as it justifies the 
developing countries fears of not being able extract the benefits of digital trade like 
their developed counterparts in the global economy, even when they have the 
necessary infrastructures in place.228 The ‘second digital divide’ refers to the 
‘difference in countries’ abilities to leverage the internet for economic and social 
gains’229 and it has been realised by a number of rising economies.230 The Networked 
Readiness Index of the World Economic Forum231 shows that while emerging markets 
may be connected and in a position to advance their digital transactions, the latter 
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rarely materialises due to a lack of skills, knowledge and training of personnel in ICT 
related fields.232  
The potential regulation of digital trade is a theoretically challenging and 
complex task that was examined in the above chapter on the work of the WTO. It is 
clear, that even the most developed nations with progressive forms of digital trade still 
grapple with the fundamental concepts, as technology is redefining trade as we have 
come to understand it.233 While the regulatory challenges may not be the most pressing 
concern for a developing nation, a basic facilitating framework would be needed to 
implement the system successfully. As digital trade progresses in a region, the need 
for efficient regulation would only increase.  
The harmonisation of the governing set of rules is a multifaceted issue that 
shall be discussed in the following chapter in the context of regional integration. One 
again, the friction between conflicting regulatory systems and infrastructures for 
digital trade may not appear to be a major cause for concern for developing countries 
yet in time it would become a costly factor in impairing further development, 
especially in Africa.234  
Connected to the general issue of regulation is the capability of a country to 
adequately address secondary considerations such as security concerns in the digital 
economy. Weak regulation, that does cater for the development of digital trade in its 
entirety, would leave a nation susceptible to threats that would further impair its 
development. The highlighted concerns are just a few considerations that may 
contribute to the notion of the digital divide at the initial stages of development and 
additional issues are likely to develop, as digital trade progresses.  
5.5. The African Group’s submission at the WTO  
The above concerns have been given international light by the African Group’s 
participation in the most recent WTO discussions surrounding the future of digital 
trade. The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce is the current governing 
framework and its contents were examined at length in the previous chapter. It was 
stated that there have been, however, calls for new discussions and negotiation on the 
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topic which culminated at the 11th Ministerial Conference held in December 2017 in 
Buenos Aires.  
The new negotiations, advocated for by the majority of WTO members, would 
aim to deal with more nuanced issues relating to digital trade that have developed in 
recent years and would cover the topics of security, efficiency, liberalisation and 
consumer protection in the digital sphere.235 While these issues have been broadly 
identified by the Work Programme for the most part, the new negotiations would be 
accelerated, specific and advanced in their approach. Such regulatory progress, 
achieved by consensus, would be in line with the developed nations’ goals and reflect 
upon their growing capabilities in digital trade. It is therefore expected that the African 
Group, comprising of 43 WTO members from the region236 and other similarly placed 
economies237 would be apprehensive towards the proposed multilateral developments.  
Furthering liberalisation in digital trade, a main goal of the new negotiations 
is somewhat controversial given the on-going concerns of the developing countries, 
who are not in a position to participate equally in global e-commerce. While 
development considerations have been factored into the proposed way forward it 
would be contradictory to promote the notion of liberalisation in the multilateral 
trading system once again, as it has not served the developing countries’ interests thus 
far. Although the phrase is not used in their communications, the African Group’s 
resistance stems from a fear of furthering the ‘digital divide’ as many African 
countries are unable to take advantage of digital development due to the lack of 
fundamental infrastructures, explained above. Thus, continuing the negotiations 
without being able to participate effectively in the system would only widen the gap, 
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favour the dominant e-commerce players238 and be contrary to the goal of developing 
digital trade sustainably.  
Instead of entering into new negotiations on the topic, the African Group 
supports the continuation of the Work Program on Electronic Commerce.239 The more 
fundamental issues that have remained largely unsolved, in their view, should be 
revised by the relevant committees of the Work Programme. The African Group have 
various other propositions advocating developmental concerns and emphasise the 
need to ‘consider measures to promote national digital industrial development with a 
view to promoting inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth.’240 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
As a result of the discussions held at the 11th Ministerial Conference, it has been agreed 
that members shall continue operating under the current Work Programme and a select 
group shall begin to consider the development of a reformed set of regulations for the 
progression of digital trade.241 While this does not oppose the requirement of 
consensus at the WTO as the status quo remains, it is a notable divide between the 
developed and the developing members. The African Group’s stance is significant in 
highlighting the needs of developing nations in digital trade and reflects upon the 
growth of the developing countries’ position in the multilateral trading system.  
While the future of digital trade at the multilateral level is not clear cut for 
developing nations, the call for the abovementioned inherent capacity issues to be 
addressed by the African Group, before considering further trade liberalisation in the 
digital sphere, can be commended. It is essential that the primary concerns with respect 
to the traditional barriers to digital trade as well as the concerns relating to the possible 
furthering of the digital divide are adequately addressed, not only in the region’s own 
development but also in the advancement of digital trade at the multilateral level.  
Further, Africa’s increased involvement in the WTO at a multilateral level 
results in one questioning which ‘platform’ might be most appropriate for the 
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development of digital trade on the continent.242 It is also necessary, particularly in the 
African context to consider how the progression of digital trade at the regional and 
global level would contribute to regional integration and the goal of continent-wide 
harmonisation.  
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Chapter Six: DIGITAL TRADE IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter will place integration in Africa in its historical context before highlighting 
the relevance of regional integration to the development of digital trade on the 
continent. The hindrances to integration in Africa, in both theory and practice, will be 
examined in order to propose how the development of digital trade can compensate 
for the challenges that have been experienced. The appropriate platform for the 
development of digital trade, between the regional economic communities (RECs) and 
a continental FTA, shall be briefly considered ahead of the recommendations which 
will be made in the subsequent chapter.  
 
6.2. Regional integration in Africa  
Regional integration in Africa involves cooperation between countries, communities 
and organizations in order to improve their ‘economic, political, social or cultural 
interaction’243 in pursuit of the ideal pan-African continent.  It can be said that 
regulatory integration efforts in Africa began in the 1970s with the Monrovia 
Symposium,244 which highlighted the need for Africa to achieve a state of unified 
independence should it wish to improve its circumstances.245 The subsequent Lagos 
Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos focused on ‘collective autonomy’ through 
regional cooperation.246  
These initiatives, in turn, created the Abuja Treaty247 which established the 
RECs as the building blocks of African integration and founded the African Economic 
Community (AEC) of 1994.248 The latter treaty devised a six-stage plan which began 
with the reinforcement of the RECs and would have concluded with complete 
integration, characterised by the free movement of people and an African Monetary 
Fund. The Sirte Declaration249 aimed to propel the implementation of the Abuja 
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Treaty’s plans and decided to establish an African Union. The Constitutive Act of the 
African Union250 was a direct outcome of the Sirte Declaration and launched the 
African Union as we know it today, in May of 2001. The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) accompanied the formation of the African Union as a support 
programme to enhance integration and was launched at the final OAU Summit in 
2001.251  
Africa has eight RECs – the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African 
Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), the South African Development Community 
(SADC), and the Arab Magreb Union (UMA.)252 While integration is not something 
that can be typically measured, the Africa Regional Integration Index253 aims to assess 
the REC’s progress in terms of trade integration, regional infrastructure, productive 
integration, free movement of people and financial and macroeconomic integration. 
Based upon this, the EAC has achieved the most success in their integration efforts 
although they are in an advantaged position, as the community already shared 
historical and cultural ties as well as a common language.254 It should be noted, 
however, that the eight RECs have developed somewhat independently and do not 
have a shared agenda that was initially envisioned for them.  
There is a general consensus that integration in Africa, for the most part, has 
failed. As seen above, the integration efforts have been characterised by numerous 
legislative attempts aiming to support and encourage integration between 
communities, yet this has not become a reality. Despite this, integration remains 
imperative to Africa’s development which is evidenced by the most recent regulatory 
endeavours,255 as the potential benefits of a unified Africa are significant.  
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6.3. The relevance of digital trade in regional integration 
Regional integration considerations are relevant to the development of digital trade, 
and vice-versa, as they both aim to facilitate and promote cross-border transactions. 
The benefits of digital trade, such as the mere ease of transacting, would only further 
the existing integration objectives. It is therefore helpful to highlight the proposed 
benefits of regional integration in Africa specifically.  
Africa is a large, fragmented continent with relatively small countries that are 
classified as developing, as opposed to developed nations. Based upon the 
geographical and socioeconomic statistics alone, integration and therefore digital trade 
are attractive options to minimise the consequences of the structural difficulties of the 
continent.  
RECs normally aim to reduce the barriers to trade that may exist between their 
members. With less restrictions, trade between the respective members would 
typically increase which would in turn result in the general economic development of 
the region.256 In order to benefit from the preferences available, the REC members 
would be encouraged to transact with each other as opposed to with parties outside the 
community. The continuous interaction between members would lead to the growth 
of the relevant markets and allow for the ‘exploitation of economies of scale’257 as 
resources, skills and knowledge can be shared. Competition would increase as 
companies and nations become more efficient in their transactions.258 The success and 
further potential of the cross-border transactions within the community would attract 
investment opportunities from inside and outside the region.259 As the level of 
integration within the community progresses, the likelihood of conflict, a particular 
challenge to Africa, would decrease.  
Beyond the typical benefits of integration are the community specific ones that 
relate to their respective objectives that have developed over the years. The EAC, for 
example, have especially benefitted from their efforts in facilitating transportation 
services, communication infrastructures, employment rates, poverty alleviation, 
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preservation of the environment and international exposure.260 It should be stated that 
many of the above-mentioned benefits have only been realised by the more successful 
RECs, such as the EAC. While the general benefits are extremely desirable for the 
continent as a whole, they are not predetermined in their entirety and would develop 
in line with the level of commitment to integration.261  
While an integrated Africa would hold many benefits for its inhabitants, one 
must remain cognisant of the position the continent would have internationally should 
it present itself as a harmonised participant. The unified Africa would only increase 
its capabilities in operating and competing in the international sphere.262 As the 
escalation of globalisation has presented its own set of benefits and challenges, it has 
become increasingly important for Africa to develop its stance in global activities. 
The above-mentioned benefits of regional integration can be directly relevant, 
in application, to the development of digital trade. It is now established, that digital 
trade has the potential to facilitate trade at an exponential rate and contribute to the 
socioeconomic welfare of a community – which is echoed in the objectives of regional 
integration. What is particularly relevant to integration, is the ease with which digital 
trade can contribute to cross-border harmonisation, in theory and in practice. It is 
therefore only fitting, at least initially from a regulatory position, to consider the 
development of digital trade as a significant step in regional integration in Africa. 
Although the benefits of integration are essential to Africa’s advancement, integration 
efforts have been met by several challenges – which are equally as relevant to the 
development of digital trade.  
 
6.4. Challenges of regional integration in Africa  
It is clear that integration on the African continent has been largely unsuccessful. 
While there are specific issues and challenges that have developed, it can be argued 
that Africa’s downfall in integration is largely based upon the approach that has been 
taken by leaders, which can also be seen in the agreements.263  
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The theories of regionalism are namely regional cooperation, market 
integration, development integration and regional integration.264 While the specifics 
of the various theories are less relevant for our present purpose, it is necessary to 
highlight the general failure of market integration in Africa. Market integration 
involves the systematic removal of economic barriers between groups, where a 
formation such as a FTA would be established to reduce tariffs until complete 
economic integration is achieved whereby the parties are operating in a common 
market.265 For the market integration to succeed like it has in EU, certain preconditions 
are needed such as the notion of perfect competition, no physical and structural 
barriers, sufficient resources and equally efficient trading parties.266 As these are 
lacking in Africa, market integration, as a theory in isolation, has not achieved the 
desired level of economic prosperity.  
The above realisation led to the adoption of the development integration theory 
which aims to apply the market integration theory in a somewhat different, and more 
suitable, way.267 The development integration theory takes a step back and aims to 
stimulate the basic productive capacity of countries,268 by ‘conscious intervention by 
the regional partners to promote cooperation and interdependence.’269 Cooperation, 
begins with political cooperation and this is the fundamental premise of this theory.  
As this theory accounts for the inequitable distribution that occurs in 
implementing these reforms, unlike the market integration theory, the development 
integration theory aims to rectify this through compensation schemes (such as transfer 
tax systems and budgetary transfer) and corrective measures (such as funds and 
development banks) while promoting self-sustenance.270 Unsurprisingly, the 
development model has been deemed to be structurally more complex, which has 
resulted in implementation problems as it is fundamentally based upon a deep-rooted 
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level of commitment that requires a nation to somewhat surrender its sovereignty for 
the benefit of all.271  
There are several other challenges to regional integration that present as 
physical restraints as opposed to theoretical complexities and they have been 
experienced by the RECs and relevant organizations at varying degrees. The 
integration processes in Africa have been constrained by a general lack of resources 
such as infrastructure, funding and institutional competence.272 As the continent is one 
that is prone to conflict in a climate of political instability, integration efforts have 
suffered in attempting to manage the consequences of such conflict.273 The capacity 
problems have been exacerbated by the overarching issue of multiplicity of 
membership between the regional groupings, where countries in Africa typically 
belong to several RECs that have conflicting frameworks and varying objectives.274 
Thus, although the multiplicity of membership could be potentially beneficial in some 
aspects, it conflicts with the primary purpose of creating the RECS which was 
ultimately for continent-wide harmonisation.  
Beyond the issue of multiplicity of membership, integration has suffered due 
to a lack of commitment from countries that do not see the advantage in somewhat 
trading political ‘sovereignty’ for the benefits of integration, where short term losses 
would lead to long term gains.275 Further, the integration movement has not seen the 
involvement of all sectors – as the ‘private sector and civil society’276 have been 
absent. The fragmented participation may explain the issue of the ‘unequal distribution 
of integration benefits’277 that has been experienced, although this is arguably a more 
complex challenge that occurs when hegemons integrate with smaller economies in a 
developing region.278 
The development of digital trade is once again relevant to the consideration of 
these challenges as it has the capability to reduce the effects of the restraining 
problems, to a significant extent. As the regulation of digital trade in Africa is still in 
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its infancy, the regional groupings and larger organizations are in the unique position 
to circumvent the issue of multiplicity of membership, by formulating harmonious 
frameworks. Mere coordination, that is effective in implementation across the 
groupings, would not contribute further to the drastic consequences of ‘poor design 
and inadequate sequencing of regional integration arrangements.’279 The private sector 
can easily become involved in the development of digital trade, and thus in the 
integration movement, as the benefits are financially appealing. The internet provides 
civil society with the opportunity to participate in integration efforts as cultural and 
social indifferences would become less significant in the digital sphere.  
 
6.5. The way forward for digital trade in Africa: RECs v CFTA  
Digital trade has the potential to facilitate the benefits of integration while curbing the 
effects of the challenges presented by integration in Africa. While the development of 
digital trade cannot solve the challenges presented by regional integration in isolation, 
it is evident that it has the potential to make a positive contribution that would be 
welcomed after the general failure that has been experienced. Importantly, the 
development of digital trade can benefit from the efforts of integration in Africa and 
with such hindsight available, aim to be more successful. The remaining question, is 
to consider which platform may be the most suitable to advance digital trade in Africa 
which requires one to essentially compare the capabilities of the RECs discussed 
above, to a potential continental platform such as a digital FTA.  
It could be argued that integration and development in respect of digital trade 
should be promoted at a continental level, as the efforts of the REC’s have not 
developed into the envisioned pan-Africa. Therefore, in order to benefit from the 
previous integration attempts, a more realistic approach should be considered with 
continent wide momentum that is harmonised from the start. On the other hand, the 
RECs have achieved notable success in their integration efforts, albeit at varying 
levels.280 Further, it is easier to formulate agreements within the smaller groupings 
which makes the endeavour of developing digital trade a more achievable goal. 
Although the RECs would benefit from their established system of cooperation, many 
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of the above-mentioned challenges to integration would remain, such as the issue of 
multiplicity of membership.  
While a formal proposition will be made in the subsequent concluding chapter, 
it is suggested that unified approach to the advancement of digital trade should be 
prioritised, whether developed within the regional grouping or at a continental level. 
Once again, the integration process poses the challenge of balancing the continent’s 
needs with international developments. ‘In essence, this means determining how 
regionalism and globalization can coexist and be conduits for, rather than hindrances 
to, growth and development in Africa.’281 This challenge, is directly applicable to the 
development of digital trade and while the RECs should be encouraged to participate 
as the benefits would be in line with their objectives, it is essential that the 
development of digital trade be promoted at a continental level in order to facilitate 
both Africa’s internal development and its external position in the international sphere.  
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Chapter Seven: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter will summarise the main observations that have been made, before 
proposing a way forward for Africa in its participation in digital trade. In concluding, 
this section will aim to answer the research objective and the related sub questions that 
were outlined in chapter one. The recommendations that follow will aim to respond to 
the challenges to digital trade that have been highlighted throughout the paper and will 
consider Africa’s continental development as well as its position in the multilateral 
trading system. The two suggestions that will be put forward relate to the promotion 
of developing digital services as opposed to digitally traded goods and the potential 
use of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) as a platform for 
developing digital trade in Africa. As the proposed solutions will not be able to address 
the development of digital trade in its entirety, various considerations that would be 
essential to future development in Africa will be briefly highlighted for further 
research.  
 
7.2. Summary  
Chapter one highlighted the overarching research objective which was outlined as 
‘how can Africa develop a framework for digital trade in order to respond to the 
international technological advancements in trade while addressing the developmental 
challenges it faces as a continent?’282 The question was preceded by an explanation of 
why digital trade is relevant to the consideration of development as evidence by 
MSMEs’ integration into the digital economy.283 The importance of the advancement 
of digital trade in Africa specifically was briefly considered as it informs the 
subsequent chapters.  
Chapter two aimed to define concepts such as digital trade, e-commerce and 
free trade areas for goods and services in order to ascertain the limits, if any, of the 
development of digital trade. As definitions provide clarity, they are an essential 
consideration to the prospective regulation of digital trade. It was seen, however, that 
digital trade and e-commerce are complex concepts and previous attempts at 
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describing them by various organizations have highlighted their limitless and evolving 
nature.284 While FTAs benefit from multilateral regulation, the formation thereof is 
not a simple task as extensive negotiation would be required for the related rules of 
origin, alongside the other agreements. As a result, it was suggested that a broad and 
inclusive approach be preferred in defining digital trade and e-commerce respectively 
and that an FTA for services, as opposed to goods, be considered as the establishment 
thereof is more favourable for developing countries.285  
Chapter three highlighted the impact of digitisation in the market as there has 
been a move from traditional forms of trade to digital trade. It is clear that the 
developments have been propelled by the fourth industrial revolution and that the 
progression of technology and digitisation has been exponential.286 Internationally, 
companies such as Alibaba and Amazon have achieved great success in their e-
commerce and related ventures while Naspers, Jumia and Kilimall have developed in 
Africa.287  
It was seen that countries regulate digital trade in various different ways in 
order to facilitate digital growth. As of 2017, COMESA began implementing its plans 
for a Digital FTA – a first of its kind for Africa.288 This is an important development, 
as African countries are typically classified as being ‘digitally restrictive’289 which 
prevents the continent from participating in this form of trade and thus cannot take 
advantage of the benefits. While there have been notable progressions in digital trade 
by the private sector, it is clear that from a cross-border regulatory perspective, Africa 
is far behind other continents – even those with predominantly developing nations.290 
This highlights the need to evaluate a way forward in this regard.  
Chapter four examined the most significant regulatory steps taken by the WTO 
in respect of electronic commerce from 1998, when the Declaration on Global 
Electronic Commerce was adopted, to 2017 when the most recent Ministerial 
Conference was held in Buenos Aires. The platform of the Work Programme and its 
bodies have managed to assess digital trade more extensively than the negotiations of 
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the Ministerial Conference’s.291 The various issues that had developed from the Work 
Programme were addressed by the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for 
Trade in Goods, the Council for TRIPS, and the Committee for Trade and 
Development respectively. While several identified issues remain unresolved and 
subsequent challenges have undoubtedly developed, it was established that digital 
trade is exceptionally complex and mere classifications present a challenge to 
regulatory negotiators.292 Despite it being ten years later, there is value in reviewing 
the Work Programme’s progress as it is the only regulatory platform for digital trade 
at the multilateral level.  
From a developmental perspective, the Work Programme’s trade liberalisation 
stance was critiqued as it does not cater for the developing nations’ primary needs in 
order for them to participate in digital trade at an equitable level.293 However, it was 
seen that the developing nations have gained an increased amount of bargaining power 
which was displayed at the most recent Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in 
2017.294  
Chapter five addressed the developmental concerns of the developing 
countries in relation to digital trade in greater detail. The position of developing 
nations in the multilateral was examined in order give context to the most recent 
developments - in particular the submissions of the African Group to the Ministerial 
Conference in Buenos Aires.295 The concerns of the developing countries are twofold, 
as they face the on-going traditional barriers to trade in the digital sphere which 
prevent them from being able to participate as well as the threat of furthering the digital 
divide should they be able to partake.296  
The fundamental issues relate to physical barriers at borders, customs 
procedures, internet connectivity, access to finance, structural inefficiencies and 
corruption. The structural problems may only be aggravated by the introduction of 
digital trade and negatively impact the countries’ developmental objectives. Even 
where nations have the required infrastructures in place, it is a reality that developing 
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countries may not benefit from such connectivity as they lack further skills and 
knowledge – which results in a second digital divide.297 Challenges such as the 
regulation of digital trade, the harmonisation thereof and the ability to counter the 
negative consequences of a digital economy would not be seen as primary concerns, 
yet in time they would impair the progression of digital trade. These considerations 
resulted in the African Group preventing the establishment of new negotiations at the 
WTO which can be commended, as the developmental concerns of digital trade have 
not been adequately addressed. 
Chapter six examined the advancement of digital trade in light of the 
correlation to regional integration, something that is particularly important to Africa’s 
development. By outlining the regulatory steps that have been taken, it is evident that 
integration in Africa has not been particularly successful despite the abundance of 
facilitating frameworks.298 Digital trade can therefore respond to the consequential 
challenges that have been faced, both in theory and in practice, and advance the 
proposed benefits of regional integration across the continent.299 It was held that the 
way forward for the advancement of digital trade is not only crucial for socioeconomic 
development and the advancement of welfare in the continent but also for Africa’s 
role in the international sphere which has been accelerated by the effects of 
globalisation.300   
Despite the RECs’ disappointment in not achieving the ideal of a pan-African 
continent, it was proposed that they should participate in the development of digital 
trade as the benefits would facilitate their own objectives, as demonstrated by 
COMESA’s recent undertaking.301 However, it was argued that it is essential that the 
development of digital trade be driven by continent-wide momentum and commitment 
and that the regulation thereof be harmonised through the use of a platform such as a 
continental digital FTA.302   
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7.3. A way forward for Africa  
7.3.1. Promoting digital services in Africa  
It has been established that Africa is in somewhat of a predicament as to how to 
respond to the development of digital trade as the continent lacks much of the required 
infrastructure and does not have continent wide regulatory frameworks in place to 
facilitate the advancement of digital trade. As a solution to the challenges mentioned 
throughout this paper and in chapter five specifically, it is proposed here that the 
continent should consider the promotion of digital trade in services, as opposed to the 
digital trade in goods, for two reasons.  
First, the digital trade in services can, to a certain extent, circumvent the 
infrastructural issues that Africa encounters when engaging in the digital sphere. 
While trade in digital services cannot respond to all the relevant concerns, it can 
alleviate the traditional barriers to trade that persist in the digital domain as services 
do not require physical transportation.303 Thus, the physical obstructions, logistical 
difficulties and the issues of the related customs procedures at country borders, would 
not be relevant and therefore not pose as an issue in the development of digital trade 
across the continent.  
Second, it is recommended that Africa should consider the formation of a 
digital FTA for services as opposed to goods, based on the above explanation of what 
the various FTA formations entail.304 From a regulatory perspective, this supports the 
general proposition as a FTA for services caters for the position of developing 
countries not only in the formation thereof, but also in terms of the substantive 
requirements.305 The informing provision requires that an FTA in services only 
eliminate the discriminatory measures, as opposed to the elimination of regulatory 
measures in their entirety which is required of an FTA in goods.306 Further, developing 
countries that are parties to an FTA agreement in services, as opposed to goods, are 
granted flexibility in meeting the requirements, in line with the respective developing 
countries’ sectoral and general level of development.307 
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Beyond the above-mentioned motivations for Africa to consider digital trade 
in services, it is evident that the proposition is in line with international trade trends, 
of developing countries specifically.  
Growth of trade in services has vastly outpaced the growth of trade in goods in the 
past few years. For example, UNCTAD data show that, in 2015, trade in services grew 
at 5 percent, while trade in manufactured goods grew at 0.3 percent. Traditionally 
exporters of commodities and lower-end manufactured products, developing 
countries increased their exports of commercial services from 25 percent to 32 percent 
of global services exports in 2006–15 (World Trade Organization 2016).308 
It could be argued, however, that despite the above development in trade Africa 
is not typically a continent that trades in services as their main export commodities are 
primary goods and natural resources.309 Despite this, trade in services should be 
encouraged as it can also stimulate intra African trade and general diversification, 
something that trading in goods has not has much success in.310 The lack of intra 
African trade and diversification is also a concern of the regional integration process 
as it is detrimental to the development of an African economy.  
 Trading in services would naturally develop as the process of industrialisation 
advances. There are a range of services, from various sectors such as banking and 
education, that can now be easily facilitated in the digital sphere. However, it is 
obvious that there would be basic prerequisites, such as internet connectivity, in order 
to facilitate the trading in digital services. While it is by no means a simple transition, 
the trading in digital services as opposed to goods, would be the ‘easiest’ way for the 
continent to immerse itself in the benefits of digital trade while remaining conscious 
of its developmental concerns and resource-constrained capabilities. 
 
7.3.2. Using the AfCFTA as a platform to regulate the development of digital trade  
It is essential that Africa considers its internal developmental agenda in navigating the 
way forward in digital trade as well as its external position in the multilateral trading 
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system. Therefore, the proposed platform to regulate digital trade in Africa should be 
able to further both these objectives simultaneously. From an integration perspective, 
it has been established that having a unified system that is harmonious in application 
from its initiation would be highly beneficial.311  
It was concluded in chapter six that while the work of the RECs should not be 
disregarded, such as COMESA’s recent establishment of a digital FTA, it would be 
ideal to further the advancement of digital trade through the use of a continental FTA 
as it would avoid the issue of multiplicity of membership, amongst others, as digital 
trade progresses.312 It is therefore appropriate to consider the African Continental Free 
Trade Area (AfCFTA) which was established in March 2018, as a potential platform 
for the advancement of digital trade. 
The AfCFTA is a continent-wide FTA that can be understood as a 
‘comprehensive partnership agreement’313 because it goes beyond the scope of a 
traditional free trade area for goods in order to further regulate related areas of trade, 
such as services, investment, competition and intellectual property.314 It may be of 
particular significance to the smaller African countries as they will be able to access a 
single continental market which they would previously not have been in a position to 
benefit from.  
‘The main objectives of the AfCFTA are to create a single continental market for 
goods and services, with free movement of business persons and investments, and 
thus pave the way for accelerating the establishment of a continental customs union. 
It will also expand intra-African trade through better harmonization and coordination 
of trade liberalization and facilitation and instruments across the RECs and across 
Africa in general. The AfCFTA is also expected to enhance competitiveness at the 
industry and enterprise level through exploitation of opportunities for scale 
production, continental market access and better allocation of resources.’315 
The preamble of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free 
Trade Area holds that the member states of the African Union established the AfCFTA 
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in order to further the objectives of the Abuja Treaty, and in certain instances, the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.316 The latter 
inclusion displays a commitment to the consideration of international advancements 
at the multilateral level. While the AfCFTA aims to develop the economic standing of 
member states generally, it is held that it is also essential to the process of 
industrialisation317 which is fundamental to the development of digital trade.  
Based upon these factors, it is proposed that in the near future the AfCFTA 
may be the most appropriate platform to advance the development of digital trade. 
While digital trade has not been a priority in the negotiations thus far, is it becoming 
an important topic of consideration with regard to the future expansion of the 
AfCFTA. The inclusion of digital trade and e-commerce has been understood as a 
continuation of the phase II negotiations which shall cover the topics of competition, 
investment and intellectual property rights in early 2019.318  
A publication of UNECA with contributions from ATRC, UNCTAD and the 
African Development Bank Group, due to be completed in February 2019, shall assess 
the above prospects and ‘consider examples of regional policy approaches to digital 
trade with a view to identifying principles for an AfCFTA digital trade protocol that 
could aid the long-term development of Africa’s e- commerce enterprises.’319 It is 
suggested that an ‘AfCFTA digital protocol’ would address data regulations, ICT 
standards and interoperability, parcel distribution and e-commerce.320 The publication 
unfortunately succeeds the present proposition but it shall undoubtedly provide further 
insight in the suitability of AfCFTA as the way forward for digital trade in Africa.  
While the AfCFTA would regulate digital trade across the continent, it would 
also present a unified platform that can participate in the multilateral trading system 
as the AfCFTA has been well received by African heads of states thus far. When the 
AfCFTA was established, 44 out of 55 AU member states signed the founding 
agreement.321 Five additional members states, including the previously absent South 
                                                        
316 Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area, 2018.  
317 Op cit note 315.  
318 UNECA ‘Concept Note: assessing Regional Integration in Africa IX: Next steps for the African 
Continental Free Trade Area’ (2018).  
319 Ibid at 7.  
320 Ibid.  
321 Tralac ‘Status of AfCFTA Ratification’ available at 
https://www.tralac.org/resources/infographic/13795-status-of-afcfta-ratification.html, accessed on 15 
January.  
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Africa, have subsequently signed the Agreement bringing the number of signatories 
to 49 out of 55.322 As 22 ratifications are required to bring the AfCFTA into force and 
there 18 to date,323 the AU anticipates the enforcement of the AfCFTA within the 
coming months.  
The general reception of the AfCFTA within the continent is promising as it 
holds great potential for furthering intra African trade and remedying the failures of 
integration that have been experienced thus far. The international support is 
encouraging as it may strengthen not only Africa’s participation in international digital 
trade but also its representation at the multilateral level, as a continuation of the 
progress made at the Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires. Should the 
establishment of the AfCFTA wish to address the challenges Africa has faced thus far, 
it needs to consider furthering Africa’s capability of developing alongside the digital 
advancements in international trade while the agreement is its infancy.  
 
7.4. Conclusion  
The considerations relevant to the development of digital trade in Africa are extensive 
and have not been explored in their entirety yet it is clear that the developmental 
concerns need to be made a priority, at the regional, continental and multilateral level. 
Through observing the progress of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, it 
is seen that the multilateral regulation of digital trade is a complex task. Developing 
country participation at this level is essential to the sustainable development of digital 
trade, now more than ever, as the negotiations continue on the regulation thereof.  
While the above propositions have aimed to address the developmental 
concerns of developing digital trade in Africa including the interlinked challenges of 
regional integration, there are other considerations that would be worthy of further 
research. Lack of access to trade finance is a restraint across all forms of trade and it 
is possible for digital trade to respond to this issue, to an extent, and cater for those 
that would previously not have been in a position to access such capital.324 Digital 
trade also has the potential to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and make online 
                                                        
322 Ibid, these figures reflect the status of the AfCFTA as of 15 January 2019.  
323 Ibid, this figure includes the ratification instruments deposited and pending.  
324 Alexander R. Malaket ‘Digital Trade and Trade Financing: Embracing and Shaping the 
Transformation’ (2016) SWIFT. 
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education, in various forms, easily accessible, which would advance a country’s 
human resources and prevent the furthering of the second digital divide which would 
be of great benefit to developing regions. It is essential to the possible success of the 
development of digital trade in Africa, to continually advance these developmental 
considerations.  
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